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World War II Remembered: The Battle of the Coral Sea - Part 2
By Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins
May 17, 2002

Dateline: 7 May 1942
The Battle of the Coral Sea
Pacific Theater of Operations

Admirals Fitch and Fletcher, with the two carriers and their escort forces, rendezvoused on 1 May at a point about 250 miles west and south of Espirito Santo. Admiral Fletcher, being of the old school which viewed the aircraft carrier as basically a fighting ship which carried airplanes, began at once to fuel. Just as he topped off, Admiral Fletcher received word from MacArthur that the enemy had been spotted moving towards Tulagi. At 1800 on 2 May, Fletcher steamed off to see if he could spot the Japanese fleet, leaving Fitch - who was still fueling - behind.

At 0800 3 May, the two Task Forces were both fueling approximately 100 miles apart, but due to strict radio silence, neither had any idea of the other's position. When Admiral Fitch commenced his fueling - 24 hours ahead of the predicted time - he steamed off towards the rendezvous point. At 1900, Admiral Fletcher (who was fueling his destroyers from the oiler Neosho) received an intelligence report from MacArthur's Australian based planes - two transports had been sighted debarking troops off Tulagi, and five or six Japanese warships had also been spotted in the area.

Fletcher was off, determined to launch an air strike against the invading Japanese troops. The American forces were now badly fragmented. Fitch and Crace were headed towards the rendezvous point 300 miles south of Guadalcanal, while Fletcher was alone, unable to repel a serious Japanese attack should one come.

The Japanese, however, were complacent after their string of easy victories in the Pacific. Admirals Goto and Marushige had withdrawn, at 1100, 3 May, after Tulagi had been secured. Admiral Hara, with his two Japanese carriers, Zuikaku and Shokaku was well north of Bougainville and the Port Moresby Invasion Group was still at anchor in Rabaul, scheduled to leave at 1800 the following day. Admiral Fletcher had an additional stroke of luck when he ran into a cold front, covering his fleet and operations from Japanese spotter planes.

At 0630, 4 May, Yorktown launched at attack group comprised of 12 TBD "Devastator" torpedo planes and 28 SBD "Dauntless" dive-bombers. Next, a combat air patrol of 6 F4F-3 "Wildcat" fighters were launched. These fighters were needed to protect Yorktown - the bombers would have to rely only upon their own .30 caliber machine guns in case of attack by enemy forces.

Lieutenant Commander Burch, and his squadron of SBDs arrived first, and began the Tulagi attack at 0815. These scout planes dropped thirteen 1,000 pound bombs, sending two small minesweepers to the bottom and damaging the destroyer Kikuzuki so badly that she had to be beached. Eventually, the tide washed her out and she sank. Lieutenant Commander Joe Taylor next arrived with his torpedo planes, which dropped eleven torpedoes but only succeeded in sinking minesweeper Tama Maru. At 0830, Lieutenant Short followed suit with another wave of bombers. They dropped another fifteen 1,000 pound bombs, but only inflicted minor damage on a couple of Japanese ships.

All planes returned safely to Yorktown by 0931 and rearmed for a second attack, which occurred an hour later. This attack damaged a patrol craft and destroyed two seaplanes; one torpedo bomber was lost to anti-aircraft fire on the return. The pilots had reported spotting three more Japanese seaplanes anchored off Makambo Island in Tulagi Harbor. Admiral Fletcher sent up four fighter planes, which successfully destroyed them. These Wildcats, spotting destroyer Yuzuki steaming away, made four strafing runs on her, killing the captain and other crewmen. However, as they returned to Yorktown, two of the F4F-3s became separated from the rest. They crash-landed on the south coast of Guadalcanal; the pilots were later rescued by the destroyer Hammann.

In the meantime, a third attack group had launched at 1400. They dropped twenty-one more bombs, but only succeeded in destroying four enemy landing craft. By 1632, all had returned to Yorktown, jubilant over what they determined an unqualified success. In reality, they had expended 22 torpedoes, 76 1,000 pound bombs and about 83,000 rounds of machine gun ammo in achieving their modest results. This would prompt later commentary by Admiral Nimitz, who would emphasize "the necessity for target practice at every opportunity" in a CINCPAC Action Report issued 17 June 1942.

Admiral Fletcher now steamed south in order to rendezvous with Admirals Fitch and Crace. On the morning of 5 May, a Yorktown patrol spotted and sunk a Rabaul based Japanese seaplane, while Admiral Inouye launched a "softening up" bombing of Port Moresby that same day.

The Japanese were, meanwhile, steaming south. The Port Moresby Invasion Group and Admiral Marumo's Support Group were aiming at the Jomard Passage, while Admiral Takagi's Striking Force was running down the outer coast of the Solomons.

By dawn, 6 May, the enemy carriers were within the confines of the Coral Sea.

Admiral Fletcher had correctly assumed that the Japanese fleet would turn the corner of New Guinea through the Jomard Passage, and he moved northwards to intercept them. Fletcher was hampered by insufficient reconnaissance due, in large part, to command tangles. The demarcation line between the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas demanded that reconnaissance be conducted by U.S. Army planes based in Australia, but they were hopelessly out of range. Fletcher was forced to use his own carrier-based planes and some seaplane recon based out of Noumea. Admiral Takagi, meanwhile, apparently never ordered a search on either 5 or 6 May. Had he done so, he would have caught Fletcher refueling in broad daylight.

The two fleets passed by one another unawares, at one time separated by a mere 70 miles. (At this same moment, General Wainwright was surrendering the remnants of his forces on Correigidor.) Four B-17s from Port Moresby spotted Goto's Covering Groups, and dropped bombs on light carrier Shoho, all of which fell wide.

On 7 May, 1942, the two fleets finally engaged. Admiral Tadaichi Hara suggested to Admiral Takagi that the Japanese forces make a through search southward in order to locate the Americans. At 0736, the Japanese spotted the destroyer Sims accompanied by oiler Neosho - they reported back that they had located a carrier and a cruiser. Hara launched three subsequent waves of attack upon the hapless ships, Sims was finally sunk at 1200 with a loss of all but 16 hands. Neosho was beset by 20 dive-bombers, who scored 7 direct hits including one plane which exploded into the No. 4 gun station.

When Captain Phillips gave the order to "make preparations to abandon ship and stand by", many of the anxious crewmen who had just seen the Sims blown up jumped over the side. Though most were rescued, some drowned and others drifted away on the life rafts they had hastily thrown over and leapt onto. Their location was misplotted by the ship's navigator, a factor which would later hamper rescuers. Neosho drifted for a total of four days, finally being located by a PBY search plane on the 11th. 123 men were rescued aboard the destroyer Henley, and taken to Brisbane for medical attention on the 12th. The unfortunate Neosho was scuttled.

Captain Phillips recalculated the navigational position of the attack, and on 17 May the destroyer Helm located and rescued four men - the last survivors of 68 men in four rafts which had banded together since their premature departure from Neosho. This appalling survival rate prompted the Navy to improve the design and equipment of their life rafts, as well as compelling them to train the sailors in basic navigational skills.

Admiral Fletcher, meanwhile, had send Admiral Crace northwards in order to attack the invasion convoy as it rounded the point. This maneuver weakened air cover for both Fletcher and Crace, and Crace soon came under attack by three successive waves of Japanese "Sally" bombers. Destroyer Farragut suffered a further indignity when she came under attack from three U.S. AAF B-17s. Admiral Nimitz, responding later to a complaint lodged by an agitated Admiral Crace, promised to "improve Army recognition of American naval vessels".

At 0900, Admiral Inouye, troubled by the varying reports on the location and strength of the American forces, decided to wait on the Port Moresby landing. As it turns out, the landing would be postponed indefinitely.

At about 1100, Admiral Fletcher launched an attack/scout group from Lexington, commanded by Commander W. B. Ault. Yorktown's planes followed. Shortly thereafter, Admiral Goto's Covering Group was spotted by Lt. Commander W.L. Hamilton. A spirited attack on the group ensued, with the SBDs being followed by waves of torpedo bombers. Enemy carrier Shoho sustained the most damage, absorbing thirteen bombs and seven torpedo hits. "Abandon ship" was sounded at 1131 and the carrier sunk within five minutes - causing a jubilant Lt. Commander R.E. Dixon to radio, "Scratch one flattop! Dixon to Carrier, scratch one flattop!"

At 1450, Yorktown and Lexington were ready to launch another attack, but Admiral Fletcher decided to wait until he could locate the Japanese carriers. Admiral Hara, however, decided to launch a sundown search and destroy mission which initially failed to locate Fletcher's fleet. While returning, the Japanese forces were intercepted by planes from Yorktown and Lexington - nine Japanese planes were downed, and two Wildcats were lost along with beloved and skilled pilot Lieutenant (j.g.) Paul G. Baker. Baker was credited with downing three of the enemy's planes.

An amusing episode followed this action. At 1900, the Japanese planes finally found Fletcher's fleet. However - lacking radar and with their radio signals inadvertently jammed by the American signals - they mistook the American flattops for their own, and tried to land. A startled sailor from an accompanying destroyer radioed over to the Yorktown, "Have any of our planes got rounded wingtips?" followed by a quick, "Damned if those are our planes!" A flurry of anti-aircraft fire leapt up, and the errant pilots sheared off - the leader only 250 yards short of the flight deck.

This nighttime raid was not one of Admiral Hara's better ideas. Out of the attack group of 12 bombers and 15 torpedo planes, 10 had been shot down by the Americans, and five more would be lost at sea trying to make the night landing. Both commanders mulled over additional night maneuvers, but further action would wait until morning. 8 May 1942.

At 0800, both the Americans and the Japanese sent out their scout planes - searching for the other's fleet. Admiral Goto's Striking Force was spotted at 0815 by Lieutenant (j.g.) J.G. Smith, and intercepted radio transmissions let Admiral Fletcher know that he had been located as well.

Yorktown launched a force of 39 planes at 0915, and at 1100 took aim at the carrier Shokaku, scoring two bomb hits which damaged the flight deck. Another 21 planes launched from Lexington scored one more hit on Shokaku. Shokaku, with a loss of 108 men KIA and 40 wounded, was sent back to Truk for repairs.

In the meantime, the Japanese assault on Yorktown and Lexington was well under way. 70 planes from Shokaku and Zuikaku pounded the carriers, and Yorktown was hit with an 800 pound bomb which penetrated to the fourth deck, killing or severely burning 66 men. Yorktown, being more maneuverable, was able to avoid further damage. The less nimble Lexington, however, suffered two bomb and two torpedo hits.

By 1145, the battle was over. The Japanese had lost a total of 43 planes, to the Americans' 33. Task Force 17.5 had scored victories in sinking the Shoho, a destroyer and several minelayers as well as inflicting damage upon Shokaku. The Japanese, in return, had sunk only Neosho and Sims. However, the final debt was yet to be paid.

At approximately 1245, gasoline vapors released by damage inflicted by the torpedo hits, were ignited by a running generator. A huge internal explosion rocked the Lady Lex, and fires erupted throughout her hull. Further explosions at 1445 wracked the vessel, and the fires soon raged out of control. At 1707, the evacuation of the crew began, and 2,735 men were rescued from the doomed ship. One man even brought along the Captain's dog.

At 2000, the destroyer Phelps administered the final coup de grace, torpedoing the hapless Lady and sending her (as Samuel Morison was fond of saying) to "Davy Jones' Locker".

With the loss of Lexington, the battle score went up accordingly for the Japanese. Nevertheless, the Battle of the Coral Sea was a great strategic victory for the United States. The Japanese forward assault had finally been halted - she would never again effectively threaten Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, the damage inflicted upon Shokaku and Zuikaku caused these two carriers to miss the Battle of Midway - the participation of these two battle hardened veterans could have turned the tide to a Japanese victory.

Admiral Yamamoto, who had furiously (and futilely) countermanded Admiral Inouye's retreat order, was further compelled to put a hasty end to the pesky American fleet - and he readied his plans for Midway. The American public, treated to articles by shipboard correspondents and interviews with survivors, were thrilled by this tale of "cool efficiency, relentless action, superb heroism and determination". The Battle of the Coral Sea provided a much needed boost to the beleaguered Allies. ***