Rules of Engagement and Other Stupid Decisions
By Thomas D. Segel
September 15, 2009
By now you have heard the story. Taliban insurgents ambushed a 13-man team of U.S. Marine and Army advisors assigned to the Afghan National Army as they approached a small hamlet. Repeatedly the Marines called for artillery support that was denied by their commanders and helicopter gunship support that took more than one hour to arrive. The refused support and slow air response caused the unit to suffer eight Afghan soldiers, one interpreter and four Marines to be killed in action.
The uproar across the military community has been deafening and the NATO commanded forces are now investigating why commanding officers rejected repeated calls for artillery fire. They are also looking into the reason why close air support that was supposed to be no more than five minutes away took more than one hour to reach the scene of the battle.
Far be it for me to claim I am some kind of Warfighting Strategist. However, it doesn't take the military intellect of a Patton to understand dumb decisions or political pontification. That being said, I have no reason to believe the current Rules of Engagement (ROE) in Afghanistan originated with those commanders on the ground who are actually engaged in the fighting.
The Rules of Engagement now in effect in that war zone are designed to appease the faint hearted rather than win a war. Are they wrong headed? Yes! Are they tailored in such a way they will harm our troops in the field? We have the bodies of four gallant young Marines along with eight national army dead to prove just how wrong the ROE is for Americans and its allies.
According to military spokesmen, the ROE has been tailored to soften the possibility of civilian casualties. General Stanley McChrystal issued the new ROE restrictions on the use of military force to reduce the risk of further alienating the population, they say.
Colonel Wayne Morris, USMC (Ret) served in the very volatile areas of Kandahar and Helmand through half of 2006 and all of 2008 as an advisor to the Afghan National Army. He says, "With the current ROE in effect, I seriously doubt we will ever get the stabilized level wherein we can turn the tables on the Taliban." He feels we need to eliminate enough insurgents nor at least neutralize their ability to influence action across a wide area, for any stabilized condition to develop.
Morris also believes we need to empower the Afghan forces to shoulder the load and gain the confidence of the Afghan people. He concludes that comment saying, "They have a long way to go before they are anywhere near being considered a viable force."
While waiting for that national force to come of age, we must continue to endure politically motivated Rules of Engagement that have nothing to do with protecting the lives of our military warfighters.
Regardless of the war we were fighting, instead of allowing our military experts to determine how we engage in combat, political decision makers, almost from the time the first shots were fired in anger, have restricted those who wear the uniform of our country. In just about every case, politicians created those horrible unintended consequences that resulted in loss of the battle, the loss of victory, and sadly, the loss of American lives. The most heartbreaking example of that political decision-making is the disastrous finale to Vietnam, triggered by our capitulation and withdrawal.
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