Comment E-mail Print Bio Archives

The gist of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's analysis that presumably will be presented to President Barack Obama is: If 1) you and Congress fully resource the effort (troops, materiel and civilian aid) and 2) if we get much better at coordinating all our assets -- Defense and State departments, the U.S. Agency for International Development, intelligence, contractors, NATO and others -- then 3) there is a better than even chance of success in Afghanistan, which will take 4) between five and seven more years. Note that the president is not likely to be told that the Pentagon can "predict" success -- only that it would be more likely than not to succeed.

Thus, the president will have to place a heavy bet at odds barely better than a gambler would get on even or odd at the roulette table. But unlike the gambler, who can leave the table, the president is forced to bet -- either go or no go. There is a potentially huge danger to leaving (as well as to escalating) -- for both national security and political reasons.

Unfortunately, while there are no easy answers, a number of appealing rationalizations and false assertions are available. They should be rejected for the comfortable untruths they are. Whether one is for getting out or staying and fighting, this is no time to avert one's mind from seeing reality straight on.

Sen. John Kerry's Monday column in The Wall Street Journal conveniently presents for consideration most of the rationalizations and false assertions that currently plague Washington decision-making:

--Much has changed, particularly a fraudulent election, since March, when the president unveiled the strategic plan for his "war of necessity" to defeat al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan through a community-focused counterinsurgency campaign that would "enhance the military, governance and economic capacity of Afghanistan" rather than merely execute counterterrorism body count hits.

Not true. The inevitability of deep fraud was revealed publicly when Afghan President Hamid Karzai decided to ally with bad warlords to win. We were debating the consequences of a fraudulent election on national television long before the election. But part of the strategy to "enhance governance" was to build on the many provincial and local leaders who were able and trusted by their people while reducing the historic corruption in the Kabul government. Also, I and many others went to open-source briefings in the spring and early summer on deteriorating conditions in the battle against the Taliban. In policy circles, there have been no recent surprises.

--We can get the job done without too many boots on the ground in Afghanistan, with sophisticated surveillance, effective aerial targeting of al-Qaida and more focus on Pakistan (Vice President Joe Biden's plan).

This is the most dangerous rationalization, though it is seen broadly by experts as implausible. (Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was publicly dismissive of the plan. See also The Washington Post, Sept. 27, "Go All-In, Or Fold," by Rajiv Chandrasekaran.) The danger is that it could allow not only our government but also our public to take the easy path it offers while falsely thinking we are not merely making a slow-motion retreat leading to victory and enhanced operational capacity for al-Qaida.

>> Continued -- Page 1 2