
Line in the Sand II: The President Makes His Case for War
By Mike Bayham
October 10, 2002
This past Monday night, President George W. Bush stated his reasons to the nation for possible military action in Iraq. The speech covered a subject that has been the dominant topic in political circles to the chagrin of Democrats who want to talk about nothing else but Enron and the economy.
The speech to the nation about Iraq was one of the most unique major policy talks I can remember. First of all, President Bush delivered his "war address" not in front of the Congress or from inside the Oval Office but before residents of Cincinnati, one of the most conservative urban areas in the nation.
Secondly, the networks to a large degree blacked out his speech on this very important subject relegating its coverage to their cable news channels. The networks have already let known their hostility towards the national party conventions by demanding that they either reduce its timeframe to three days as opposed to the four days they currently occupy or risk further curtailing in their coverage. One has to wonder how seriously the network heads take our government when they place "Dharma and Greg" before "George and Al."
Even though I do not share their sympathies or their mindsets, political dissenters to the war were the most seriously snubbed by the networks' "ignoring" of the president's speech since the opposition is typically allowed to broadcast their objections after a major address. Dovish liberals should include the media for having poor priorities in their broadsides against those who are looking to stifle debate about the looming military action in Iraq. It appears that in order for any person of prominence who opposes the war to gain any media coverage it is necessary to issue their disagreements in front of a large portrait of Saddam Hussein in downtown Baghdad.
The president outlined his arguments to the American people that ranged from the eradication of a wicked regime that has engaged in barbaric acts against his countrymen and neighbors to Hussein's drive to develop weapons of mass destruction, which could be used against the United States.
The president also said that passage of the "war resolution" did not mean that military action was guaranteed. However, since he spent a great deal of his address focusing on the "evil side" of Hussein and his failure to follow through on previously agreed upon deals, it can be inferred that Iraqi dictator has no intentions of truly complying with the terms laid out or voluntarily removing himself from office making war inevitable.
It has also been implied by the Bush administration that the White House's "saber rattling" might motivate some of the Iraqi military leadership into initiating a coup to overthrow Hussein. However Bush's reference to a defector's claim that Hussein is a "student of Stalin" is a telling sign that such a "happy occurrence" is very unlikely. If Hussein were a true disciple of the late Soviet dictator, then he has already followed the path of the Georgian totalitarian and has taken precautions within his own camp by purging any officer suspected of entertaining the slightest thought of revolt.
The point that President Bush probably had his most success in selling to the people was the need to destroy Iraq's potential for producing nuclear weapons. By citing data from satellite photographs and former regime figures, Bush painted a vivid picture of Iraq's increasing nuclear capabilities and their ability to produce a nuclear weapon from a "softball" sized piece of enriched uranium.
The President's emphasis on the reality that waiting would be a greater risk might have also struck a chord with the public. The surprise attacks that came on September 11th have shown the importance of enacting preemptive measures to nip potential problems in the bud. The strategy, if it can even be called that, of covering our eyes with our hands and wishing threats away is nothing more than an invitation for future terrorist strikes.
Polls have shown that the president has a considerable amount of support for military action against our twelve year old nemesis, though there has been some question on how solid that endorsement is. The success the United States had in what will probably be termed come 2003 as the "First Gulf War" and the routing of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan has given the nation confidence in our military strength.
However, the war in Iraq will entail a significantly different strategy than the previous two operations. In the Gulf War, the objective was the liberation of Kuwait, a country smaller than New Jersey, and the reduction of the Iraqi military's ability to reinvade after being expelled from the emirate. An invasion of Iraq itself is a much more formidable task, even though American forces had occupied portions of the country during the Kuwaiti campaign. In Afghanistan, US forces were greatly assisted by indigenous fighters who had been fighting the Taliban since they came to power. Seizing Baghdad will be a lot harder task than capturing Kabul.
Iraq is 25 times larger than Kuwait and the Iraqi army might put up a stronger fight to defend their homeland than they did to protect the conquered emirate. Also, America's one time Gulf War allies have been reluctant to endorse or offer a commitment of assistance in an Iraqi invasion. Iraq's neighbors and the world at large have not been as supportive of the president's plans as most Americans. The possibility of being deprived of logistical assets such as military bases would add a burden that was not present during the first conflict.
Even if the fervor that is usually present in the period before a war is missing, the reasons to engage in military action to permanently neutralize Saddam Hussein and to eliminate Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction are there and were stated clearly in President Bush's speech. Despite the lack of a global and domestic consensus, the Bush administration has laid down terms that Hussein will not meet, meaning that war with Iraq is probably right around the corner.